I understand that many of our members may not have looked deeply into the phenomenon of “Unconventional Warfare”, “Special Warfare”, “Black Operations”, “Clandestine Operations”, and “Psychological Operations”. I would now invite all readers to brace up and muster some personal inner strength in preparation for learning how the powers that be often-times manipulate our perception of reality, and why this is done to us by malicious people working inside our government. (Please note – I am not saying our government is malicious – I’m saying that some people working inside our government are malicious. Big difference; think about that.)
Also, many of our members are unaware that through such off-the-record operations as I just named a powerful stressor is introduced into the national psyche through media manipulation. Psy-Ops warriors inside our military are trained to use “surrogates” to create public traumas which are then interpreted through the entire mainstream media outlets to convince the public that a specific government action is needed for our “national security interests”.
I had been home from the war for over thirty years when I learned the truth about the Vietnam war. I learned about it at the Vietnam Veterans of America website. I was able to verify what the VVA said by reading books. I urge all Veterans of all wars to read more books. The truth is out there, but it remains aloof until one starts looking for it.
Several days ago I grabbed a copy of the March 2013 issue of American Legion Magazine and found this story on the Tonkin Gulf. It is online now. I am going to quote heavily from that article but urge every reader here at Oath Keepers to click the link and read the entire piece at its source.
It breaks our hearts to learn, after many years and many deaths, that the Vietnam war was initiated by nefarious operations of the U.S. government. The Gulf of Tonkin incident of 1964 is a classic example of our government’s use of “false-flag” events to build public support for desired military operations which Americans would normally oppose. Of course the most classic of all False Flag operations is the Northwoods Document which was released through a FOIA suit by James Bamford in 2000, and we will be posting that here at Oath Keepers shortly. But the Gulf of Tonkin “incident” was actually put into effect, was deployed in action, where the Northwoods plan was only planned and sent to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara. It was scrapped by President Kennedy and was never acted on as initially written.
The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to U.S. involvement with uniformed ground forces and air forces in Viet Nam – and it was a big, completely fabricated lie. This is one shining example of how government forces at the Federal level will deliberately deceive the American people and try to keep the conspiracy secret.
Be advised. And if you are a Vietnam Veteran, or just an American who wants to know the truth, do go to the American Legion Magazine online and read this article in full. Thank you for reading!
Elias Alias, editor
THE AMERICAN LEGION presents:
The Mysteries of Tonkin Gulf
by John Prados – March 1, 2013
The Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964 proved to be America’s key entry point to war in Vietnam. The encounter sparked the first open fighting between the United States and North Vietnam, the first U.S. bombing of the North and an intensification of U.S. support for South Vietnam. It led to congressional passage of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, which became the legal justification for America’s entry in the war. As with so much about Vietnam, events in the Gulf of Tonkin were not what they seemed at the time, and the consequences proved enormous. Even after five decades, we still struggle to understand what happened at the Gulf of Tonkin and why.
Things seemed clear-cut at the time. During the afternoon of Aug. 2, 1964, the U.S. destroyer Maddox was steaming in the Gulf of Tonkin – waters of the South China Sea between the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (i.e., North Vietnam) and the Chinese island of Hainan – when it came under attack from North Vietnamese torpedo boats. Maddox retreated down the gulf, where the destroyer C. Turner Joy joined it. Both ships headed back north in company.
On the night of Aug. 4, the warships, particularly C. Turner Joy, reported renewed attacks against them. President Lyndon B. Johnson, denouncing “hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas,” ordered retaliatory bombing against North Vietnamese naval bases. Sixty-four planes from the aircraft carriers Ticonderoga and Constellation attacked the North in what was called Operation Pierce Arrow. Two aircraft were shot down and one pilot – Lt. j.g. Everett Alvarez Jr. – was captured, becoming the first U.S. prisoner to be held by the North Vietnamese in Hanoi (the body of the other pilot lost, Lt. j.g. Richard C. Sather, was repatriated in 1985). Johnson asked Congress for a joint resolution approving his orders. Passed almost unanimously in the heat of the affair, this became the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, and its open-ended sanction of “all necessary measures to repel any armed attack … and to prevent further aggression” became a crucial legal underpinning of the entire U.S. effort in the Vietnam War.
Doubts and Secrecy. In subsequent years – even while the fighting in Vietnam still raged – many aspects of the original account came into question. The first important element to come under scrutiny was the question of provocation for the North Vietnamese attack on Aug. 2. Senior administration officials, from Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara on down, testified in hearings on the Tonkin Gulf Resolution that the U.S. warships had been in international waters and exercising free passage, their cruise unrelated to anything else. Certain “South Vietnamese” commando raids, “if there were any” (per McNamara’s testimony), were unknown aboard Maddox.
But suspicions to the contrary arose. By 1966, advocates were calling for a repeal of the resolution. Increasing doubts and political pressures led to new hearings in 1968, during which McNamara admitted that Maddox had been operating in close proximity to the commando raids, which he now represented as of South Vietnamese origin. The Tonkin Gulf Resolution was repealed in 1970; Johnson repeated the story of the “South Vietnamese” raids in his 1971 memoir.
Secrecy surrounding these events gradually unraveled. Maddox, it turned out, had been on a mission specifically aimed at collecting intelligence on North Vietnamese communications and coastal radars. Then it emerged that Maddox, though in international waters when it fought off the North Vietnamese torpedo boats, had been in territorial seas when the Vietnamese patrol craft left base to intercept it. The commando raids had not been South Vietnamese after all, but attacks using indigenous troops, unilaterally controlled by the U.S. special operations command in Vietnam. The strikes that took place during the Maddox cruise were partly intended to trigger the North Vietnamese to activate their nets so that the United States could record them. The 1971 leak of the Pentagon Papers revealed that the attacks themselves formed part of an extensive program of “graduated military pressures” against the North called OPLAN 34A. When audiotapes of Johnson’s telephone conversations on these days were declassified in the late 1990s, those with McNamara showed that both were aware of the connection between the Maddox mission and the coastal raids from the very beginning….(snip)
….No Evidence. By far the deepest mystery of the Tonkin Gulf concerns the “second attack,” the notion that on the night of Aug. 4 the North Vietnamese came back to fight Maddox and C. Turner Joy together. It was this allegation of a repeated attack in the face of U.S. warnings that underpinned the retaliation. But unlike the sea battle of Aug. 2, there was no physical evidence for this engagement. The destroyers had maneuvered to avoid torpedoes, and Lt. Cmdr. Robert C. Barnhart Jr.’s C. Turner Joy pumped out more than 370 5-inch and 3-inch shells, yet there were no photos of attack boats, no shells hitting the ships, no prolonged observation of an enemy. Capt. John Herrick reported an initial radar contact. After that, Maddox dispatches recorded a mélange of sonar and radar contacts. When the ship trained its guns on the most solid of these, the vessel in the cross hairs was C. Turner Joy. Barnhart’s destroyer detected nothing on sonar, not even the torpedo some of his sailors said they saw.
As the on-scene naval commander, Herrick sent a dispatch warning against premature action – he and Maddox’s skipper, Cmdr. Herbert L. Ogier, doubted the authenticity of everything except the initial radar contact. Aircraft scrambled from Constellation and Ticonderoga also failed to spot anything, and when vectored to attack by the destroyers, found only the U.S. warships beneath them when they rolled in.
It turned out to be Washington on a hair trigger. The Johnson-McNamara telephone tapes show the president and defense secretary mulling over bombing targets before the alleged attack was even reported. This was possible due to National Security Agency (NSA) communications intercepts – and therein lies another tale. When the very first sighting report arrived, Washington and the Pacific Fleet presumed the expected attack and made their strike plans. McNamara and Johnson discussed specific targets before any meetings took place.
But the intelligence was wrong…. (snip)
….The NSA’s listening posts in the region included one at Phu Bai in Vietnam, another in the Philippines, and the special van installed aboard Maddox for the cruise. The Philippines base had decoded its intercepts and reported them in a timely fashion, but the Phu Bai base was delayed and reported late – in fact, during the time frame of the alleged second attack. Washington officials compiling communications intelligence summaries assumed that the late Phu Bai intercepts were up-to-the-minute reporting and included them as such. They did not check with Maddox, which itself recorded no messages indicating a renewed attack. In addition, one dispatch that analysts at Phu Bai decided was the attack order for Aug. 4 contained decoding and translation errors and was intercepted by no one except that station. Washington officials either did not notice or did not care that the messages corresponded to the actual events of Aug. 2, or that North Vietnamese Swatow-type patrol boats were not armed with torpedoes and lacked speed to maneuver as indicated in the destroyers’ spot updates on the wild night of Aug. 4. They also discounted Herrick’s warning dispatch. Johnson retaliated, and North Vietnam and the United States moved closer to war…. (snip)
…..The Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee staff director, Carl Marcy, also discovered the discrepancies. Yet they remained concealed for a very long time. In 2005 and 2006, the NSA finally declassified full texts of the most important intercepts, revealing the chronological transpositions in its messages. The agency’s official history on Vietnam, declassified in 2007, examines the evidence and concludes that there was no incident in the Gulf of Tonkin on Aug. 4, 1964. The NSA also released the full record of its Tonkin Gulf messages, demonstrating how reporting from Phu Bai differed from other intercept stations….
Today, the Gulf of Tonkin reminds us that small events can have enormous consequences. Only one American died – Sather during Pierce Arrow – as well as a small number of North Vietnamese sailors. But the bombing gave the war new intensity. It also challenged the North to strike directly at Americans, as Hanoi did starting with Bien Hoa. And the Tonkin Gulf Resolution would be stretched beyond its context to cover a commitment that no one except the war managers foresaw. Events can be crucial not just for their intrinsic importance, but also as a hinge for the plans and purposes of others, and for what an adversary might conclude from them. Americans in Vietnam, and since, would have to relearn that lesson….(snip)
I have only included some parts of the article. Please do go to the source site and get the full story.
For those who still believe we went to war in Vietnam to contain communism, please refer back to my article of October 01, 2012 -
Elias Alias, editor
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